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Abstract: Many regional governments in developed countries design programs to improve 
the competitiveness of local firms. In this paper, we evaluate the effectiveness of public 
programs whose aim is to enhance the performance of firms located in Catalonia (Spain). 
We compare the performance of publicly subsidised companies (treated) with that of 
similar, but unsubsidised companies (non-treated). We use the Propensity Score Matching 
(PSM) methodology to construct a control group which, with respect to its observable 
characteristics, is as similar as possible to the treated group, and that allows us to identify 
firms which retain the same propensity to receive public subsidies. Once a valid 
comparison group has been established, we compare the respective performance of each 
firm. As a result, we find that recipient firms, on average, change their business practices, 
improve their performance, and increase their value added as a direct result of public 
subsidy programs. 
JEL Classification: H25, H32, L25, L53 
Keywords: Public policy, evaluation studies, firm performance, Propensity Score 
Matching. 
 
Resumen: Muchos gobiernos regionales en los países desarrollados diseñan programas 
para mejorar la competitividad de las empresas locales. En este papel, evaluamos la 
efectividad de programas públicos cuyo objetivo es reforzar la actuación de las empresas 
localizada en Cataluña (España). Se compara la actuación de empresas subvencionadas 
(tratadas) con empresas similares, pero no subvencionadas (no tratadas). Se utiliza el 
Propensity Score Matching (PSM) para construir un grupo de control que, con respecto a 
las principales características, es muy similar al grupo tratado, lo que permite identificar 
empresas que presentan la misma propensión a recibir subvenciones. Una vez se ha 
establecido un grupo de comparación válido, se comparan los resultados de cada empresa. 
Como resultado se encuentra que, en promedio, las empresas tratadas cambian sus prácticas 
comerciales, mejoran su actuación, y aumentan su valor añadido como resultado directo de 
los programas públicos. 
1. Introduction 
 
In recent years, there has been an increase in the number of studies analysing the impact of 
economic policy measures whose aim is to boost industrial competitiveness. This increase has 
occurred within the context of burgeoning freedom of trading conditions, a context which has 
tended to generate stronger international competition, together with a need to both maintain 
balanced public accounts as well as ensure maximum effectiveness in the implementation of 
public policy measures. 
 
Studies of the impact of public subsidy programs conducted at the national level1 include 
Arvanitis et al. (2002), who analyse the effectiveness of advanced programs of technology 
diffusion in Switzerland, Lerner (1999) and Wallsten (2000), who examine the impact of the 
Small Business Innovation (SBIR) program in the US, and Roper et al. (2004) who, using an ex-
ante qualitative exercise, study the private and social benefits of R+D projects for the UK. With 
regard to Spain, studies include Corchuelo (2006), González et al. (2005), Acosta and Modrego 
(2001), Heijs (1999 and 2001) and Busom (2000) who, interestingly, reports that public 
financing induces increased efforts in R+D by private firms. 
 
While varying widely in their geographic scope, all of the aforementioned studies have in 
common their use of parametric techniques for performing policy evaluations.2
 
Recently, however, a non-parametric technique, Propensity Score Matching (PSM, hereafter), 
has gained increased popularity in the performance of evaluation exercises. Using PSM to 
undertake studies at the national level, Almus and Czarniztki (2003) look at the impact of public 
subsidies on a firm’s R+D intensity in Germany, Duguet (2003) analyses the consequences of 
public subsidies for the private financing of R+D activities in France, and Herrera and Heijs 
(2003) evaluate the importance of public subsidies for R+D in Spain. With Czarniztki and Fier 
(2002) and Aerts and Czarniztki (2004) who analyse the impact of R+D policies in the Flemish 
region in Belgium, and Gabrielle et al. (2006) who study the Trento region in Italy representing 
notable exceptions, the PSM technique has, however, scarcely been utilised in studies at the 
regional level. Yet it is precisely the regional level, for countries such as Spain, the most 
appropriate for studying the impact of public polices. 
                                                 
1 In general, evaluation exercises conducted at the regional level are less frequent. See for instance, 
Lenihan (2004) who studies the impact of public subsidies on the Shannon region in Ireland or Meeusen 
and Janssens (2001) who analyse the impact of subsidies on the Flemish region of Belgium. 
 
2 For instance, Arvanitis et al. (2002), Corchuelo (2006) and Busom (2000) use a probit estimation, 
Lerner (1999) an OLS estimation, while Wallsten (2000) uses a simultaneous equation approach to deal 
with possible problems of endogeneity of public subsidies. 
The decentralization process initiated in Spain during the 1980s has allowed regional 
governments to adopt their own industrial promotion measures and so tackle the peculiarities of 
the regional industrial structure more effectively. In this paper we focus on the region of 
Catalonia, whose industrial structure is characterised by the presence of a majority of Small and 
Medium Enterprises (SMEs, hereafter), and a high degree of productive diversification. Catalan 
industry represents around 25% of Spain’s total industry and, as such, its competitive position 
as well as the impact of public policy actions to promote it, is of particular interest. 
 
Over the last two decades, Catalan regional industrial policy has undergone a radical evolution 
in orientation; with interventions forming part of various plans aimed at overcoming some of 
the region’s structural weaknesses and reinforcing the innovative capacity of Catalan firms (see 
Callejón and García-Quevedo, 2000). Beginning with the adoption of such measures as support 
for specific sectors (the so-called “picking winners approach”), it has evolved towards a policy 
which seeks to enhance the economic environment in which all firms operate and, thus, promote 
R&D activities as the source of competitiveness (see Costa and García-Quevedo, 2000).3
 
The public subsidies which we evaluate in this paper form part of the Catalan industrial policy 
that is incorporated within the European Commission’s Regional Program for Technology 
Transfer Strategy 2000.4 Public subsidies in Catalonia are managed by a Catalan Public Agency 
(CIDEM, hereafter)5 whose job is to promote the competitiveness of Catalan industry. The total 
value of subsidies evaluated in this paper is around €8.6 million, which represents 
approximately 66% of CIDEM’s total budget and around 0.03% of the Catalan industrial Gross 
Value Added (see section 3 for more details). 
 
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the impact of the public subsidies conceded by CIDEM in 
2000. We estimate the impact of these subsidies on the growth rate of the recipient firms’ Value 
Added (2000-2002) in two steps. First, we use PSM to evaluate the impact of public subsidies 
by comparing outcomes associated with firms which receive public support and those which do 
not. Here, PSM is a highly appropriate methodology as it enables us to both control the 
                                                 
3 The new Catalan government, which took office in November 2003, has recently implemented a new 
plan called Catalonia’s Research and Innovation Plan 2005-2008. 
 
4 Some of the subsidies analysed were designed by the Spanish central government to promote local 
industries through high-priority lines for SME such as the SME’s Consolidation and Competitiveness 
Plan 2001-2006, drawn up by the Spanish Ministry of Industry. In this case, however, the Central 
government transfers funds to regional governments, which are guaranteed independence in procedures, 
resolutions and liquidations in the application of the program. 
 
5 From the Catalan acronym for Centre d’Innovació i Desenvolupament Empresarial 
(http://www.cidem.com). 
distribution of public subsidies as well as reduce some of the main methodological problems 
associated with policy evaluation. 
 
Second, and also using the propensity scores, we match each recipient firm with the one that it 
most closely resembles in the control group. Thus, we obtain a dataset of firms which allows us 
to assess, through regression techniques, the impact of public programs on the competitive 
position of Catalan firms. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarises the main methodological 
issues involved in the discussion. Section 3 describes the database used. Section 4 presents the 
main results obtained. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Methodological issues 
 
The best method for evaluating public programs is “true” or natural experiments based on 
random assignments, as they offer the strongest foundations for analysing the relationships of 
causation (see Lalonde, 1986). In experimental designs of this type, units are assigned at 
random to “treatment and control groups”. On average, the units in each group are equivalent 
with respect to all their shared characteristics. Thanks to this equivalence, the influence of 
external factors that could contribute to the observed results of units can therefore be eliminated. 
Hence, any differences in the observed results between the two groups can be attributed 
exclusively to the implementation of the public program. 
 
Nevertheless, the adoption of an experimental plan based on random assignments for the 
evaluation of public programs designed for firms, such as those analysed in this paper, is 
generally not practical for a variety of reasons. First, public agencies are unable to refuse the 
concession of subsidies to eligible companies.6 Second, often treated and non-treated firms 
differ in characteristics that affect the results of the program (i.e. selection bias).7
 
                                                 
6 In other words, a natural experiment cannot be designed in this framework because the concession of 
subsidies for eligible firms cannot be refused on the grounds of conducting an evaluative experiment. 
 
7 Consider a situation in which there exists a type of manager who is more likely to adopt measures which 
will improve the firm’s results. It is probable that such a manager will seek public subsidies more actively 
than a manager who is satisfied with the current situation of her company. Thus, the improvements 
observed can be more closely attributed to management differences between firms than to the services 
provided by public programs. 
The evaluation of public programs therefore requires an alternative method, a quasi-
experimental approach which allows us to compare the results between two groups of 
companies: those which receive public subsidy (treated firms), and those that do not (non-
treated firms), with the understanding, however, that not all the subsidies are randomly 
assigned. In other words, we construct a control group that has ex-ante the same probability of 
receiving a public subsidy in such a way that both treated and non-treated firms can be 
considered as if they have been randomly assigned. 
 
If we consider receiving public subsidy as being the treatment effect, we can define the primary 
effect that we wish to capture as the expected treatment effect for the treated population, or 
ATT: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )111 0101 =−===−= DYEDYEDYYEATT    (1) 
 
where, Y1 is the outcome for firms which receive public subsidy and Y0 is the outcome for 
recipient firms not exposed to the treatment, that is, firms who do not receive public subsidy. 
Finally,  is an indicator of participation (D=1 for the treated firms, D=0 for the non-
treated firms). 
{ }1,0∈iD
 
As we mention above, receiving a public subsidy cannot be considered a completely random 
event and, therefore, ( 10 =DYE )
                                                
 is not observable and must be estimated given that is the 
counterfactual outcome that participants on average would experience if they do not to 
participate in the program.8 To support this, matching econometric estimators, based on the 
seminal contribution of Lalonde (1986),9 are shown to produce valid estimates of program 
impacts. 
 
Using matching estimators we are then able to build a counterfactual sample of firms (the 
control group) by pairing each recipient firm with a non-treated firm.10 As Rubin (1977) points 
out, a necessary assumption here is conditional independence between non-treated firms’ 
 
8 Many evaluation techniques are based on regression equations which do not consider the counterfactual 
state of the results’ variables (for instance, sales or revenues), or in other words, which do not compare 
the levels of these variables in the absence of public subsidies with those in the presence of such 
subsidies. 
 
9 Many studies examine the strengths and limitations of matching methods using non-experimental data, 
see for instance Dehejia and Wahba (1999, 2002) and Smith and Todd (2004). 
 
10 See section 3 for more details on the construction of both groups of firms, and on data requirements. 
outcomes and program participation, conditional on observables (X).11 The control group, 
therefore, is constituted by non-participant firms whose distribution of observed characteristics 
is as similar as possible to that of the treated firms. This requires: 
 
( ) XxxXD ~for           11Pr0 ∈<==<     (2) 
 
and guarantees that all treated firms have a counterpart in the control group. 
 
An implementation problem arises when the vector X is highly dimensional, as it is in our case 
(see Section 3). Rosembaum and Rubin (1983) proposed the use of the probability (a scalar 
function) of receiving treatment conditional on covariates. This probability is the propensity 
score, p(X). The matching method would estimate the ATT as: 
 
( )( ) ( )( ){ }1,0,1 01 ==−== DXpDYEXpDYEEATT    (3) 
 
Eq. (3) is derived from Eq. (1) with the requirement of an adequate balancing of pre-treatment 
variables. If this balancing hypothesis is fulfilled, observations with the same propensity scores 
must have the same distribution of observable characteristics which are independent of their 
treatment status. In other words, the establishment of a random exposure to the treatment and 
control groups. 
 
Given that the propensity score is defined as the conditional probability of receiving a treatment 
given the pre-treatment characteristics, we estimate a probit model with the covariates 
estimation  
 
{ } ( ){ }XhXD Φ== 1Pr     (4) 
 
where Φ is the logistic function, and h(X) is an initial specification which includes all the 
covariates as linear terms (see Greene, 2003 for more details).  
 
As we clarify in Section 3, thirteen covariates are included in the initial specification. These can 
be broadly grouped in variables associated with the firms’ characteristics, market-related 
variables, and classic productive factors. 
 
                                                 
11 See for more details Rubin (1974 and 1977) or Angrist et al. (1996). 
Once we calculate the propensity scores, we can use several matching estimators. We construct 
the match for each treated firm as a weighted average over the outcomes of non-participants, 
where the weights depend on the distances between estimated propensity scores. The more 
similar the firms are in terms of these propensities, the higher the weight. Here, we employ four 
matching alternatives: the Nearest Neighbour estimator (NNM), the Radius estimator, the 
Stratification estimator and the Kernel estimator (see Becker and Ichino, 2002 for technical 
details).12 With the two groups of firms, “treated” and “non-treated”, constructed using this 
methodology, we are now able to perform the first evaluation exercise defined in Eq. (1), which 
is to estimate the average treatment of the treated firms. 
 
In a second evaluation exercise, we use the estimated propensity scores to construct various 
control groups (a robustness check)13 which when combined with the treatment group allow us 
to estimate, through a regression model (see appendix 1), the impact of public subsidies 
conceded by CIDEM, measuring the difference in the evolution of certain results’ variables (for 
instance value added, sales, or productivity) and controlling for other potentially influential 
factors. 
 
 
3. Data 
 
The main information source used in this paper is the Sistema Anual de Balances Ibéricos 
(SABI, hereafter). This database is a fully representative sample of firms in Spain and Portugal 
and contains accounting information at the firm level. It holds information on 838 076 Spanish 
firms, 182 004 of which are Catalan.14
 
The SABI database enables us to analyse the behaviour of a very wide sample of firms, as it 
contains information both on the variables which appear on a standard balance sheet, such as 
those referring to the firms’ results, including revenue from activity and value added, as well as 
on the various measures of these results (from exploitation, from financial activities, from 
                                                 
12 Briefly, the various matching estimators differ in their definition of closeness between a treated firm 
and its most similar non-treated firm in terms of the estimated propensity score. 
 
13 The various groups are constructed with different numbers of observations, that is, matching each 
treated firm with the one, two, and five most similar (with respect to the propensity score) firms from the 
control group. 
 
14 The availability of data from the SABI database increases with the size of the firm. For small firms the 
SABI includes less than 5%, although they represent 31.4% of the overall employment in that category. 
However, the SABI covers 31% of firms with more than nine workers, and more than half of the larger 
firms (55.3%). The importance of these figures shows that the sample of firms recorded in the SABI can 
be considered sufficiently representative of the population of Spanish (and Catalan) firms. 
ordinary activities and/or from extraordinary activities). Information can also be derived from 
the ratio analysis: profitability (economic and financial), financial expenses, manoeuvre margin, 
treasury ratios and balance ratio, ratios of solvency, indebtedness, and liquidity (both general 
and immediate). 
 
As we have the firms’ postal codes, we can organize the information at a territorial level, and as 
such locate firms with increased precision. As the activity of each firm is classified according to 
the NACE-Rev.1 classification,15 we can also disaggregate by sector. Finally, we can accurately 
define company size by examining information concerning the number of employees. 
 
For our study, we collected data from the SABI database for the variables which we are 
interested in from two points in time: first from 2000, the year in which the subsidy was 
granted, and second from 2002, in order to determine if, over time, a significant impact from 
public subsidies on the main aggregates of firms had been felt.16
 
All the information required to construct the treatment group was obtained directly from 
CIDEM, while all the information needed for those firms that did not apply for a public subsidy, 
and thus were not recorded by CIDEM, was located in SABI. The total number of applications 
received by CIDEM in the year 2000 was 1 844, of which 821 were accepted.17 We were able to 
locate 601 of the successful applicants in the SABI database, but we were not able to obtain the 
relevant information for all of them. Therefore, our study is conducted using 421 firms which 
received a public subsidy and for which there is complete information in the SABI database. 
This gives us a covering ratio (treated firms with all the relevant information with respect to the 
total number of treated firms) of 51.3%. 
 
Our treatment group, then, is comprised of 421 firms which received a public subsidy from 
CIDEM. These companies are distributed by sector, by type of subsidy, as well as by location. 
In the sectoral dimension, the NACE-Rev.1 classification is used (two digits) and includes 60 
economic activities. 
 
As mentioned earlier, we use matching techniques for constructing a valid comparison or 
control group. We also choose those firms that have the same propensity to receive public 
                                                 
15 Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community. 
 
16 The year 2002 is the last year for which we have most information for a high proportion of firms 
recorded in the SABI. 
 
17 We only have information for firms that finally received a public subsidy and not for the rest, i.e. those 
firms which unsuccessfully applied for a subsidy. 
subsidies, given a series of characteristics of the firms, from the SABI database. Clearly, the 
first step in selecting firms that might have been considered for the control group involves 
eliminating all those companies that received a subsidy and all those companies that operate in 
economic sectors not represented by any firm in the CIDEM records (sectors in which firms did 
not apply for a subsidy). Therefore, we had the records of 66 763 firms from SABI, with the 
eventual group from which we could select (using matching techniques) the control numbering 
32 011, after a process of elimination for those firms not eligible because data availability 
issues. 
 
Finally, we selected the control group by using the estimated propensity score and as well as 
matching techniques. We estimate the scores using a probit estimation which included the 
covariates outlined in the section below. 
 
3.1 Variables for determining the propensity to receive public subsidies  
 
The variables used to estimate the propensity scores were selected on the basis of related 
empirical evidence and the information available in the SABI database. Previous studies have 
identified certain variables that can determine the propensity to obtain a public subsidy. 
Structural variables such as size, economic sector or location seem to be important here. Other 
studies have also identified as relevant information about the competitive position of the firm, 
its effort and orientation in innovation, management strategy, and the degree of 
internationalisation of the firm. Finally, studies based on multivariate models (see Bonnet, 
2002) have considered, in addition to structural variables, aspects such as innovative behaviour, 
the characteristics of the market and the difficulties involved in obtaining financing for 
innovation. 
 
Thus, the three groups of relevant variables that appear when analysing factors which influence 
propensity to receive a public subsidy are a firm’s characteristics, market-related variables, and 
classic productive factors. Table A.1 in Appendix 2 presents the descriptive statistics from the 
variables used. 
 
From the first group of variables, size (L), proxied by the number of workers, is one of the most 
commonly used, although the findings on the effect of this variable are unclear. Despite the 
presence of a number of public subsidies designed exclusively for SMEs, the hypothesis that 
public subsidy dispensation favours firms of smaller size is not confirmed in all the studies 
consulted (Heijs, 1999 and 2001; Arvanitis et al., 2002; and Almus and Czarnitzki, 2003). Some 
studies report positive discrimination in favour of SMEs, while others point out that bigger 
firms are more frequently the beneficiaries of public subsidies. 
 
Another important variable here would appear to be the economic sector in which the firm 
operates. Previous studies suggest that public programs mainly benefit companies in highly 
dynamic sectors, but in studies of Spain, however, the empirical evidence is not conclusive. On 
the one hand, some analyses identify sectoral differences (Heijs, 1999, 2001; Busom, 2000), by 
reporting a low level of participation in public programs on the part of firms operating in 
traditional sectors (or sectors with low propensity for innovation), and a high level of 
participation among high technology firms and firms based in the R&D sectors. On the other 
hand, other studies report evidence of an absence of such sectoral differences (see Fernández et 
al., 1996). We include in the PSM estimation two dummy variables to control for the economic 
sector in which the firm operates: high technology manufacturing (Dht), and high technology 
services (Sht). 
 
A third salient variable is a firm’s age (Years), which is calculated as the number of years the 
firm has been operating in the market. We can therefore interpret this variable as an indicator of 
a firm’s experience and the ability to obtain external resources (Busom, 2000; and Almus and 
Czarnitzki, 2003). Although it would seem that the explanatory power of this variable is 
generally poor, in Busom (2000) it is shown to be statistically significant and useful for 
explaining the propensity of firms to participate in public programs.18
 
Location (Loc) is another variable commonly taken into account in the literature. The results, 
however, do not seem to show a significant influence on the propensity to receive a public 
subsidy. In developed countries, where there are unquestionably more instruments to support 
private initiative, public instruments operate in one of two ways: either to support advanced 
regions (efficiency argument) or to support lagging regions (equity argument) where there is a 
greater need for public intervention. In case of Catalonia, these arguments can be translated into 
a dummy variable that distinguishes between firms located in the municipality of Barcelona (a 
central and comparatively territory) and the rest of the Catalan region.  
 
Another frequently used variable which we adopt here is a firm’s property structure. The 
hypothesis is that firms with a greater share of foreign capital are less likely to apply for (and 
hence obtain) local subsidies while firms with a higher percentage of shares in public sector 
hands appear to have a greater propensity to apply for a public subsidy, and in the case of Spain, 
                                                 
18 We also include a quadratic term for the effect of a firm’s age on its propensity to receive a subsidy 
(years2) in order to capture any possible non-linearities in the relationship. 
these hypotheses appear to have been confirmed.(see Busom; 2000). Moreover, Almus and 
Czarnitzki (2003) show that firms belonging to an entrepreneurship group have a greater 
propensity to apply for subsidies than “independent” firms. We use an indicator of 
independence (Inin) directly provided by SABI, which takes the value 1 if any shareholder has 
more than 25% of the total number of shares. 
 
Although the literature considers it important for determining the innovative behaviour of firms, 
few studies have quantified and analysed the role of management in a firm’s propensity to 
request or receive a subsidy.19 In this study, we use a diversification variable to (partially) proxy 
the management strategy, given that diversified firms (firms with a more ample range of 
products) might be more interested in public subsidies than specialised firms, as it can be argued 
that the purpose of a subsidy is more likely to coincide with the activity of a diversified 
company than with that of one more specialised. Here, we use the number of subsidiaries as an 
indicator of the degree of diversification of a firm (Nsub). 
 
A final important variable in this group is credit constraints which appear to be an important 
determinant of a firm’s propensity to apply for a public subsidy. First, because the firm may be 
more likely to seek financing in the public sector if it encounters difficulties in the private 
sector, and second, because some subsidies are specifically addressed to firms for which credit 
constraints act as a barrier to certain activities, among these innovation. We proxy credit 
constraints with the firm’s solvency ratio (Solv). 
 
The second group of variables, the market-related variables, which might affect the propensity 
of a firm to receive a public subsidy, serve to control for the competitive atmosphere in which 
firms operate, although many studies do not include this type of variable because of the 
difficulties involved in obtaining relevant data. Here, we analyse two aspects of the competitive 
atmosphere; firstly the degree to which the firm has opened up internationally as a proxy for the 
level of competitiveness, and secondly the investment capacity of the firm.  
 
In common with other studies (Heijs, 1999 and 2001; and Busom, 2000), we consider a firm’s 
exports to be its measure of competitiveness. Firms with a high propensity to export appear to 
be more likely to participate in public programs since such activities as R&D are of strategic 
importance to a firm’s ability to compete and remain in the market. Additionally, the 
government might be more likely to support these firms given their potential to transfer 
innovation to the rest of the economy. Unfortunately, as we do not have data on the value or 
                                                 
19 One of the main reasons for not including this variable is the difficulty involved in reflecting the notion 
of management in a single variable. 
volume of exports and/or imports, we make use of two dummy variables; one which indicates 
whether the firm exports (Exp) and another which indicates whether the firm imports (Imp).20
 
The second variable of this group which we consider is a firm’s investment capacity, directly 
related to its development process and to the evolution in its main markets.21 It is important to 
control for this variable when analysing the propensity to obtain a public subsidy since firms 
with a greater investment capacity are more likely to invest more heavily in R&D and therefore 
do not retain any evident need for a public subsidy. To capture this effect, we use the capital 
requirements variable (Creq) taken from the SABI database.  
 
Finally, it is worth noting that many of the studies mentioned up to this point report that the 
firms which participate most in public programs tend to be the most innovative. In this study, 
however, given the limitations of our database, we have been unable to include any variables 
related to firms’ innovation. Nonetheless, it seems clear that the classic productive factors play a 
role in the determination of the competitive capacity of firms, and consequently in their results. 
For this reason, we have included a firm’s capital (K) and intermediate inputs (M) in the 
estimation of its propensity to obtain a public subsidy. In addition, we use the labour factor, a 
factor already incorporated in the first group of variables. 
 
 
4. Main results 
 
With the dataset outlined above, we first estimate a probit model to obtain the propensity scores 
(section 4.1) for each firm. Second, using these scores and various matching techniques to 
obtain the control group, we calculate the average benefits to the treated firms (ATT) by 
examining the effects of public subsidies on a firm’s results (section 4.2). Third, and for various 
control group sizes, we use a regression technique to evaluate the impact of the different public 
programs aimed at promoting the performance of Catalan firms (section 4.3). 
 
4.1 Determinants for receiving public subsidies 
 
The results of the probit estimation used to calculate the propensity scores (PS) are presented in 
Table 1 for three different specifications (denoted by SP1, SP2 and SP3, respectively), enabling 
                                                 
20 This lack of data concerning the value or volume of exports/imports prevents us from constructing, for 
instance, an import activity variable, which might also capture the pressure of foreign competition in the 
domestic market. 
 
21 Firms usually invest heavily in modernization and innovation during these processes. 
us to check their robustness. Of the variables considered in the previous section, some do not 
appear in Table 1 as their presence violates the requirements imposed by the calculation of the 
PS (Loc, Nsub, Solv and Creq).22
 
Briefly, the variables that determine the propensity to be awarded public subsidies from CIDEM 
are stable across the three different specifications shown. The variables which prove significant 
in all specifications are those variables related to a firm’s characteristics. First, the variables that 
accounts for high technology sectors: manufacturing (Dht) and services (Sht) variables are 
highly significant, indicating that firms operating in these sectors have a greater propensity to 
receive subsidies. Second, export activity (Exp) is also significant, which indicates that firms 
facing external competition are more likely to be subsidised in order to transfer their technology 
to international markets, or simply to maintain their competitiveness both domestically and 
internationally. Finally, the number of years that a firm has been operating (proxy for 
organizational capacity and experience) is also statistically significant. In this case, we also 
include the square of the number of years’ term so as to capture the effects of the learning curve; 
our results show an inverted U relationship, indicating that the propensity to receive a subsidy 
increases with the age of the firm up to a certain point and then subsequently decreases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 Not all the specifications satisfy the requirements to construct the PS. In Table 1, therefore, we only 
present the variables that satisfy these so-called balancing conditions. For the technical details of this 
method, see Becker and Ichino (2002). 
Table 1. Propensity to receive a public subsidy 
  SP1 SP2 SP3 
     
Constant  -6.4531 *** -5.7685 *** -6.4821 *** 
 (-20.36)  (-26.27)  (-20.16)  
Years  0.0452 *** 0.0484 *** 0.0448 *** 
 (3.26)  (3.49)  (3.21)  
Years2  -0.0006 *** -0.0006 *** -0.0006 *** 
 (-2.82)  (-2.91)  (2.78)  
VA  0.2718 ***  0.2762 ** 
 (3.77)   (2.48)  
L  -0.1237  0.0561  -0.1485 * 
 (-1.51)  (1.02)  (1.75)  
K    -0.0192  
   (-0.23)  
M   0.0863 ** 0.0343  
  (2.48)  (0.80)  
Inin 0.5138 ** 0.5643 ** 0.5189 ** 
 (2.11)  (2.32)  (2.13)  
Imp  0.2527  0.2341  0.2354  
 (1.52)  (1.40)  (1.41)  
Exp  0.3281 ** 0.3361 ** 0.3196 ** 
 (2.03)  (2.08)  (1.98)  
Dht  0.6715 *** 0.6973 *** 0.6645 *** 
 (4.98)  (5.18)  (4.92)  
Sht  0.8624 *** 0.9312 *** 0.8974 *** 
 (2.99)  (3.22)  (3.09)  
          
Log-Likelihood -2189.6 -2167.5 -2162.8  
Pseudo R2 0.025 0.024 0.026  
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90, 95 and 99 
percent levels, respectively. Data are for the year 2000. The number of observations was 32,431. The 
dependent variable is 1 if the company receives a public subsidy and 0 otherwise. Estimation carried out 
with a probit model. Inin is 0 if the company has one or more shareholders with more than 25% of the 
shares. Imp is 0 if the company does not import. Exp is 0 if the company does not export. Dht is 0 if the 
company is not part of a high technology manufacturing sector. Sht is 0 if the company is not part of a 
high technology services sector.  
 
 
From Table 1 we can conclude that sectoral differences are highly significant in determining the 
propensity of a firm to receive a public subsidy. This indicates that public subsidies in general 
(without specifying program type or origin) are mainly directed towards high technology 
sectors. This result confirms previous empirical findings for both Spain (Heijs, 1999 and 2001; 
Busom, 2000), as well as other countries (Arvantis et al., 2002; Almus and Czarnitzki, 2003; 
Czarnitzki and Fier 2002), which indicate that certain sectors, most prominently high tech, 
participate more actively in public programs than others. 
 
We can also see that while structural variables, such as a firm’s size and independence indicator, 
influence its propensity to obtain a public subsidy, location and difficulties encountered in 
financing managerial activities (credit constraints) do not appear to have an impact. For this 
reason, we do not include the latter variables in the determination of the propensity scores. 
 
In the case of market-related variables, a firm’s investment capacity seems to have no impact on 
the propensity score, while in the case of the classic productive factors, their relevance is found 
to be small and not very significant. For instance, capital (K) only entered in SP3, and is not 
significant, while intermediate inputs (M) is only significant in SP2. 
 
Size, proxied by the number of employees, is not significant in the first two specifications, but 
in the third we find it to have a negative and significant influence on the propensity. It seems, 
then, that SMEs do receive public subsidies with a greater frequency than big firms. This 
finding contradicts usual reports for this variable both in the Spanish case (Fernández et al., 
1996; Heijs, 1999 and 2001; Zubiaurre, 2002) as well as in the cases of other countries (Almus 
and Czarnitzki, 2003; Czarnitzki and Fier, 2002). In fact, a classic result from the literature is 
that a 10% increase in the size of a company typically implies a 0.7% increase in the probability 
of participating in public programs. We cannot consider, however, the results we present here 
for size in SP3 as being robust given the poor performance of this variable when changing 
specification. 
 
4.2 The effects of public subsidies on a firm’s performance: a first approximation  
 
After analysing and controlling for observable differences between groups of firms, we then 
estimate the average effect of public subsidies on the value added growth rate of the treated 
firms. Our results for the third specification (SP3 in Table 1) presented in the previous section 
are summarized in Table 2.23
 
In order to estimate the average effect of the treatment, we use an area of common support, 
which enables us to eliminate those firms that present poor matching (see Figure 1). The sample 
of firms varies according to the proposed estimator, as companies can never be identical, and so 
the size of the control group is non homogeneous. Moreover, as the requirements that have to be 
met when calculating the different estimators vary, the number of firms in the treatment group 
also varies. Thus, the number of firms receiving a subsidy is 417 (or 416 in the case of the 
Radius estimator), with the control group oscillating between 414 in the lowest case (Nearest 
Neighbour estimators) and 30 603 in the highest case (Stratification and Kernel estimators). 
 
                                                 
23 The estimators for SP1 and SP2 are presented in Tables A.2 and A.3 in Appendix 1. 
Figure 1. Box-Plot of treatment and control distributions of predicted propensity scores 
(using specification 3 in Table 1) 
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Source: Own elaboration. 
 
 
The average effect of the public subsidies granted by the Catalan government is, in most of the 
cases, significantly different from zero. In the period 2000-2002, the treated firms recorded a 
value added growth that was, on average, between 3.5 and 5.6% higher than that of non-treated 
firms. Table 2 shows that the parameters obtained by means of nearest neighbour estimators, 
NNM(1) and NNM(2), are not statistically significant, but remain significant in all the other 
cases. 
 
Significant estimations show that treated firms present value added growth rates that are 3.5% 
higher in the case of the Kernel estimator, 4.4% higher in the radius estimator, and 5.6% higher 
in the stratification estimator than non-treated firms. It seems, therefore, that the inclusion of 
more companies increases the statistical significance of the estimators (bearing in mind, of 
course, that the requirements for the construction of the control group differ according to the 
estimator used). 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Average effect of subsidies on firm’s performance for SP3 
  t-statistic Firms 
 ATT A B T C 
      
NNM (1)  0.017 0.7 0.606 417 414 
      
NNM (2)  0.011 0.436 0.439 417 414 
      
Radius 0.044 2.307 2.246 416 10 316 
      
Stratification  0.056 - 3.091 417 30 603 
      
Kernel  0.035 - 2.034 417 30 603 
A – t-statistic (analytic)     
B – t-statistic (bootstrapping )    
T – Treated firms      
C - Control firms      
(1) Nearest neighbour with random selection     
(2) Nearest neighbour with identical weights    
Source: Own elaboration.    
 
 
These results appear robust, as the estimators obtained for the other specifications considered in 
Table 1 to obtain the PS (SP1 and SP2 in Tables A.2 and A.3 in Appendix 2) confirm. 
Effectively, nearest neighbour matching parameters are not statistically significant, but with 
other estimators the parameters present a variation ranging from 3.5% in the Kernel estimator 
and 5.7% in the stratification estimator for SP1 and 2.5% and 4.4% for SP2. Moreover, we 
always find the radius estimator to lie somewhere between the two extremes (the kernel and 
stratification estimators). 
 
In short, Table 2 shows that the subsidies granted by CIDEM have a positive effect on the value 
added growth rate of firms which receive them. It is clear that the organisational, managerial 
and other internal changes necessary to ensure the successful implementation of the projects for 
which they receive the subsidy makes companies more dynamic and competitive, and that this is 
manifested in a growth differential when compared with those firms that did not receive 
subsidies. 
 
4.3 The impact of public subsidies on value added growth  
 
In this section, we conduct a second evaluation of the public programs available to Catalan 
firms. Our ATT results show that, on average, firms that receive subsidies are more dynamic. 
However, the matching technique we adopt does not discriminate by sector or by any other 
variable as it simply uses the estimated PS. In this section, we perform a new matching exercise. 
First, we separate firms by sector and, then, to construct the control group, we matched up the 
most similar firms within each sector according to the PS. We perform this matching on three 
levels: 
 
i) 1:1 matching: we match a firm receiving a subsidy with the most similar firm from 
the same sector according to the PS. 
ii) 1:2 matching: for each treated firm we identify the two most similar firms in the 
same sector. 
iii) 1:5 matching: we identify five control firms for each treated unit, although always 
selecting from the same sector of activity. 
 
We identify these three different control groups in order to determine the threshold of similarity 
between treated and non-treated units. The hypothesis we formulate is that if there is no average 
treatment effect differential between the treated unit and its most equal control group (that is, 
with a 1:1 matching), then both groups are so equal that non-treated firms will be seen to carry 
out projects similar to those of treated firms but financed by non-public sources in order to 
maintain their competitiveness. This holds, however, only in the case of a significant average 
effect differential with the larger control groups, and determines the real effect of the subsidies. 
Should there be no average effect differentials of public subsidies between the treated group and 
the largest of the control groups (1:5), then we are left with the indication that public programs 
to promote a firms’ competitiveness are ineffective. We use this approach for checking the 
robustness of the results, and estimate using regression techniques for the production function 
presented in Appendix 1, as well as the different control variables presented in section 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Impact of public subsidies on value added growth 
 Control group 
 (1:1) (1:2)   (1:5)  
Constant 1.16 *** 1.3362 ***  1.4319 ***
 (11.89)  (16.62)   (25.03)  
ΔL  0.5407 *** 0.5560 ***  0.5205 ***
 (16.37)  (20.86)   (28.11)  
Δ 0.3334 *** 0.2943 ***  0.3227 ***
 (10.47)  (11.76)   (17.86)  
Lt-1 0.2889 *** 0.3221 ***  0.3471 ***
 (11.03)  (14.61)   (22.04)  
VAt-1 -0.3003 *** -0.3446 ***  -0.3683 ***
 (-12.24)  (-16.9)   (-25.28)  
Inin  -0.0367  -0.0015   0.0131  
 (-0.37)  (-0.12)   (0.14)  
Nsub  0.017  0.0239 *  0.0328 ***
 (1.30)  (1.99)   (3.29)  
Loc  0.0304  0.0359   0.0861 ***
 (0.65)  (0.86)   (2.72)  
Exp  0.0138  0.0263   0.1584 ***
 (0.22)  (0.43)   (3.21)  
Dht  0.0433  0.0303   0.0096  
 (1.11)  (0.94)   (0.42)  
Sht  -0.0195  -0.0458   -0.0458  
 (-0.24)  (-0.68)   (-0.96)  
T 0.1025 *** 0.1325 ***  0.1011 ***
 (2.70)  (4.10)   (3.79)  
N  826  1239   2478  
F  56.13  92.77   184.71  
Adjusted R2  0.424  0.449   0.449  
Note: t-statistic in parentheses. *, * * and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90, 95 and 99 percent 
levels, respectively. The dependent variable is value added growth between 2000 and 2002. Estimates 
carried out by means of ordinary least squares. Inin is 0 if the companies have one or more shareholders 
with more than 25% of the shares. Loc is 0 if the company is located outside the municipality of Barcelona. 
Exp is 0 if the company does not export. Dht is 0 if the company is not part of a high technology 
manufacturing sector. Sht is 0 if the company is not part of a high technology services sector. T is a dummy 
variable that takes the value 0 if the firm did not receive a subsidy. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
 
As Table 3 shows, we observe that the change in the number of employees (ΔL), the change in 
the capital stock (ΔK), along with the value added (VAt-1) and the number of employees (Lt-1) for 
the base year are highly significant. The variables that capture the variation in the quantities of 
the productive factors (K and L) are positively related with the firms’ value added growth rate. 
In addition, as we successively use control groups containing more firms, the estimated 
parameters remain constant as the number of observations increases. 
 
Our results show that both firms with a higher number of employees in the initial period and 
firms with smaller value added in the initial period grow rapidly. This result points to the idea 
that once firms have reached a certain level of value added, it is more difficult to find 
mechanisms which allow high growth rate to be maintained. In other words, firms with low 
value added have a greater margin in which to increase this factor at higher rates than firms that 
have already achieved a high level of value added. We should stress that the definition of value 
added that we use here refers to the increase in the value of a firm’s products, calculated as the 
deduction of intermediate costs from the production value. 
 
When using all three control group sizes, we obtain a significant effect for the variable that 
accounts for a firm receiving a public subsidy or not. This result is highly robust to the three sets 
of estimations presented. When we consider a narrow control group, in which each firm is 
matched to its most similar control, public subsidies are significant with an elasticity of around 
10%. When we expand the control group to consider more than one match per firm, 1:2 and 1:5 
respectively, we find that public subsidies are statistically significant and they have a positive 
and significant impact on the determination of differential growth in value added for recipient 
firms in the period under analysis. The results also indicate that the optimal threshold for 
controlling the average effects of public subsidies is that of the 1:2 matching and that the 
regression in this case gives the best results in terms of precision. 
 
The results presented in Table 3 show that, in general, both the variables which define a firm’s 
characteristics as well as its market-related variables are not significant when explaining value 
added growth for the 1:1 and 1:2 control groups.24 Only when the control group is increased to a 
1:5 relationship do these variables appear significant. Specifically, these variables are the 
number of subsidiaries (Nsub), defined as a measure of differentiation, which indicates that 
diversified firms grow faster, location (Loc) which signifies that firms in the municipality of 
Barcelona also grow faster and, finally, the exports variable (Exp) which indicates that 
exporting firms also show higher growth rates for value added. Finally, it is worth noting that 
the dummy variables controlling for high technology manufacturing and services sectors are not 
significant, indicating that there is no differential growth rates for these two groups of firms. 
 
Public subsidies, therefore, can be seen to have a positive and significant impact on the value 
added growth of the firms which received them.  
 
Given that the objective of subsidies is the promotion of quality, R&D activities, managerial 
information services and the strengthening of managerial cooperation between firms as a 
mechanism for the enhancement of their competitiveness and, hence, market positioning and 
                                                 
24 The only exception is the number of subsidies in the regression with the 1:2 control group, which is 
significant at a 10% level of confidence and shows a positive sign. 
results, we can verify that the firms which receive a subsidy become more dynamic. This is 
something which becomes apparent when their growth differential is compared with firms 
which did not receive a subsidy. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we carry out an evaluation exercise to analyse the impact of public subsidies 
whose aim is to improve the performance of Catalan firms. An important element for such an 
evaluation exercise is that it fulfils the requirements necessary for a counterfactual design based 
on the construction of a control group which allows for the accurate measurement of the effects 
of such subsidies. 
 
As such, the Propensity Score Matching methodology is used to build up a control group 
comprised of firms which do not receive a subsidy, but which can be considered as the closest 
matches to their treated, or recipient, counterparts. This method allows us to evaluate the impact 
of public subsidies through the Average Treatment of the Treated. 
 
The propensity scores obtained here indicate that variables such as age, sector (especially high-
tech), property structure, and export activity of firms positively affect a firm’s propensity to 
receive a public subsidy, and that the results seem to be robust to different specifications. Using 
the propensity scores in an initial attempt to estimate the effects of public subsidies, we find 
that, on average, the firms which received a subsidy in the year 2000 recorded a higher growth 
rate of value added during the period 2000 - 2002. 
 
Furthermore, in a second step, we estimate a production function at the firm level for the 
treatment and control groups (the latter we create with the estimated propensity scores), and find 
that the public subsidies managed by CIDEM have a positive impact on the growth rate of the 
value added for recipient firms. This positive and significant impact, bearing in mind the 
construction of the control groups, suggests that the results are robust and that, indeed, public 
subsidies promote growth differentials between treated and non-treated firms. 
 
These conclusions must be framed within a comprehensive evaluation of the subsidies 
conceded by CIDEM for the promotion of local firms. Although the rigorous approach which 
we present here yields credible estimates of program impacts, in the absence of random 
experiments, causality can always be called into question, particularly given potential 
selection bias. While the construction of the control group and the specification of the model that 
we use in this evaluation helps to minimize potential bias, future efforts need to address this 
problem more exhaustively. The explicit modelling of the selection process using longitudinal 
data awaits further attempts by those interested in measuring the impact of public subsidy 
programs. 
 
Appendix 1 
 
Our aim is to estimate the variation in the firms’ results, focusing our attention on the effect of 
public subsidies. We use a modified Cobb-Douglas production function, where production (Q) 
is a function of labour (L), capital (K) and materials (M), as well as of the specific effects for 
each firm (F) and industry (I):  
 
),,,,( iiiiii IFMKLfQ = ,    (A.1) 
 
subtracting materials (M) from each side of the equation yields: 
 
),,,( iiiiiii IFKLfMQV =−= ,   (A.2) 
 
where Vi is the value added of firm i.  
 
Since we are interested in estimating the contribution of public subsidies from CIDEM to a 
change in firms’ value added, we adopt a growth accounting framework. By first taking the 
differences in the production function in (A.2) we obtain the following relationship:  
 
iiititit IFKLV ++Δ+Δ=Δ logloglog ,   (A.3) 
 
where value added is expressed as the change between two years: 2000 and 2002. The specific 
effects for company and sector are also assumed to be fixed in the growth equation and, 
therefore, they are not represented in terms of a variable of change.  
 
To control for specific effects at firm level, we include the logarithm of the total number of 
workers and the logarithm of the value added, both for the base year. The first variable controls 
for the initial firm size, while the second controls for the initial levels of competitiveness and 
positioning in the market. Formally, the estimated equation appears thus: 
 
iiiiititit eIEVEKLV ++++Δ+Δ=Δ logloglogloglog , (A.4) 
 
where  is the change in the logarithm of value added, it VlogΔ it LlogΔ  is the change in the 
logarithm of the number of workers, it KlogΔ  is the change in the logarithm of capital, 
 is the logarithm of the value added in the initial year,  is the logarithm of the iVElog iElog
number of workers in the initial year, Ii is set of dummy variables to control for certain 
characteristics of the participating firms, and, finally, ei is an error term. 
 
To conclude, we introduce the variables related to public subsidies (denominated as T) to 
estimate their effects on the growth rate of value added for recipient firms compared with non-
recipient firms:  
 
iiiiiititit eTIEVEKLV +++++Δ+Δ=Δ logloglogloglog .  (A.5) 
 
T denotes dummy variables that take the value 1 if the firm received a subsidy (treated) and 0 if 
not. 
Appendix 2 
 
 
Table A.1 Summary statistics 
  Treated  Non treated 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
L  25.6 36.7 1 465  29.6 169.8 1 15 003 
K  3 759.2 6 252.2 72.4 57 809.1  6 499.8 10 8470.3 3.3 11 400 000 
M  2 353.5 4 209.7 0 43 262.7  3 317.8 45 873.1 0 5 024 350 
Dht  0.2 0.4 0 1  0.1 0.3 0 1 
Sht  0.0 0.2 0 1  0.0 0.1 0 1 
Years  19.0 10.9 5 71  16.3 10.2 5 107 
Loc  0.2 0.4 0 1  0.1 0.4 0 1 
Inin  0.0 0.2 0 1  0.0 0.1 0 1 
Nsub  0.4 1.6 0 17  0.3 2.3 0 226 
Solv  30.3 22.8 -130.6 90  28.9 32.1 -948.8 100 
Exp  0.1 0.3 0 1  0.1 0.2 0 1 
Imp  0.1 0.3 0 1  0.1 0.3 0 1 
Creq  44.8 127.8 -93.4 952  45.9 134.8 -99.9 996 
           
N  421  32011 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.2. Average effect of subsidies on firm’s performance for SP1 
  t-statistic  Firms 
 ATT A B  T C 
NNM (1)  0.011 0.446 0.434  421 420 
       
NNM (2)  0.002 0.070 0.081  421 420 
       
Radius 0.045 2.388 2.297  420 11 089 
       
Stratification  0.057 - 2.527  421 31 309 
       
Kernel  0.035 - 1.946  421 31 309 
A – t-statistic (analytic)      
B – t-statistic (bootstrapping )     
T – Treated firms       
C - Control firms       
(1) Nearest neighbour with random selection      
(2) Nearest neighbour with identical weights     
Source: Own elaboration.     
 
 
 
 
Table A.3. Average effect of subsidies on firm’s performance for SP2 
  t-statistic  Firms 
 ATT A B  T C 
NNM (1)  -0.007 -0.257 -0.274  417 417 
       
NNM (2)  -0.005 -0.196 -0.230  417 417 
       
Radius 0.034 1.695 1.907  415 11 237 
       
Stratification  0.044 2.346 2.137  417 30 704 
       
Kernel  0.025 - 1.344  417 30 704 
A – t-statistic (analytic)      
B – t-statistic (bootstrapping )     
T – Treated firms       
C - Control firms       
(1) Nearest neighbour with random selection      
(2) Nearest neighbour with identical weights     
Source: Own elaboration.     
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